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CASE NO. 7663 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE POULSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
C. V. MANNESS, doing business as 
Manness Construction and Appliance 
Company, and UDELL WOOD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ELDON A. ELIASON, and 
PRESTON D. RICHARDS, 
Atto~neys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The respondent herein will refer to the parties by name 
or as Plaintiff and Defendants. References to the transcript 
are designated, (Tr. - .. ) References to the record· other 
than the transcript are designated, (R.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages 
for personal injuries and for damages to his jeep automobile 
which he sustained by reason of an intersection collision 
which he had with the Defendants on August 4, 1949. 
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The Statement of Facts set out by the Defendants in their 
brief is incomplete and seeks to rely on only a small portion 
of the record. 
Mr. Archie Poulsen, the Plaintiff, left his home in Sugar-
ville the morning of August 4, 1949, to go to Delta. He was 
driving his jeep automobile and was accompanied by his 
wife, Norma Poulsen, who sat in the front seat on the right 
side, and his small son, James, who sat in the front seat 
between them. Archie Poulsen was going to obtain some 
repair parts for equipment which he was repairing and he 
had accomplished that part of his mission and was returning 
to his home in Sugarville, which is a distance of approxi-
mately fourteen (14) miles from Delta, when the accident 
with the Defendants occured. The Plaintiff left Delta at 
approximately eleven o'clock a.m. travelling a county high-
way known as th Sugarville-Hinckley road, which road con-
nects Sugarville with such town as Hinckley, Deseret and 
Abraham, and connects with the Abraham road which goes 
to Delta. The Plaintiff was traveling North on this Sugar-
ville-Hinckley road at an average speed of approximately 
twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) miles per hour, (Tr. 15). 
He had watched his speed because of a new engine which 
he had put in the jeep, (Tr. 15.) 
On the same day and at the same time, which was approx-
imately eleven-thirty o'clock a. m., the Defendant, Udell 
Wood, was driving the automobile which was owned by De-
fendant, C. V. Manness, and Udell Wood, was driving as 
an agent and employee of said C. V. Manness, (Tr. 180.) 
Approximately four miles South of Sugarville, the Sugar-
2 
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ville-Hinckley road intersects with a road known as the 
Topaz Road. This road received its name from being the 
road out to the now abandoned Topaz Japanese Relocation 
Center. 
Defendant Udell Wood, and one Bud Barker in the em-
ploy of C. V. Manness, were traveling this Topaz road in 
Defendant C. V. M~mness' Oldsmobile at the time of the ac-
cident. going West. 
Both the Topaz road and. the Sugarville--Hinckley road 
are county maintained roads and at the point of the intersec-
tion, the Sugarville-Hinckley road is approximately sixty 
(60) feet wide and twenty-four (24) feet wide across the 
travel portion which was graded and graveled. The Topaz 
road is approximately sixty (60) feet wide and twenty (20) 
feet wide across the oiled surfaced portion, which oil had 
been put on in 1945 for the Japanese camp. The road is now 
used as a farm-to-market road. The Topaz road, at the place 
of the intersection, had approximately a two or two and one-
half (2 or 2 1h) foot additional shoulder, graded and gravel-
ed, on each side of the oiled surface, ( Tr. 22, 41, 83, 124), 
which portion was also traveled upon, and it was difficult to 
tell where the oiled portion stopped as the gravel covered 
over part of it and the traffic used it as a regular part of 
the road. For all practical purposes, the Topaz road runs 
East and Y../ est and the Sugarville-Hinckley road runs North 
and South and at the intersection both roads are level with-
out any apparent grade. There was no stop sign at either 
of these intersecting roads, (Tr. 134.) 
On the date of the accident both roads were heavily lined 
with sunflowers and other weeds. These weeds and sun-
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flowers continue along each road in each direction for sev-
eral mles. 
Both the Topaz road and the Sugarvlle-Hinckley road 
have other intersecting roads crossing them at about ·~very 
one-half (1-2) mile apart. There are about six (6) such other 
roads intersecting or crossing the Topaz road in an area of 
three (3) miles, (Tr. 66, 134.) 
When the Plaintiff reached the intersection on his return 
trip home, it was approximately eleven-thirty a. m. He ap-
proached the intersection with the Topaz road and drove his 
jeep so that the front wheels were approximately three feet 
from the oiled portion of the road, (Tr. 15, 22.) From this 
point the front of his car extended over the traveled por-
tion of the road which was graded and graveled and travel-
ed, and right up to the oiled surface. From the seat in ·~he 
Jeep, it was scarcely discernable where the oiled surface 
stopped. But when the Plaintiff stopped his jeep, he looked 
to the East, which was his right, and he could see up the 
Topaz road approximately four hundred (400) feet, (Tr. 15, 
52, 53, 56, 57, 69, 77). His wife also looked up the road. His 
and his wife's vision farther up the road than this was ob-
scured because of the tall weeds and sunflowers v.-hic:• 
grew along the side of the road. The Plaintiff testified that 
his vision of the road for four hundred ( 400) feet was clear 
and that he observed no vehicles upon the road, (Tr. 69, 77.) 
Mrs. Poulsen also testified that she saw no vehicle upon 
the road as she looked to her right. (Tr. 111). Then Plain-
tiff testified that he looked to the west but could not see so 
far, (Tr. 15), because the line of Sunflowers on the West 
side of the intersection extended farther up against ·~he 
Topaz road, because of a turn in the ditch at the intersec-
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tion. (Tr. 53, 63). He then testified that he put the ] eep in 
low gear and started North until he could see the road 
West, (Tr. 15, 53, 63.) He testified that when he could see 
clearly to the West he again turned and looked East and 
this time saw the Defendants' car coming toward them about 
forty ( 40) or fifty( 50) feet away, (Tr. 15.) Plaintiff testif-
ied the Oldsmobile was traveling towards him at about sev-
enty (70) miles per hour, (Tr. 18, 58,.) Plaintiff further 
testified that he had traveled about ten feet after looking 
East the first time, before he looked East the second time 
and he had reached the approximate speed of between five 
(5) and ten (10) miles per hour, (Tr. 60), and was near-
ing the center of the road. The Defendants Oldsmobile 
came straight into the side of Plaintiff's jeep without at-
tmpting to stop or reduce speed until he was about thirty 
(30) to forty ( 40) feet from the jeep, (Tr. 15 18). 
At the time of the impact, the Plaintiff's jeep had travel-
ed nearly all the way across the road with the front wheels 
of the jeep being very near the North side of the oiled por-
tion of the Topaz road, (Tr. 61, 81), The Defendants Olds-
mobile struck the jeep near the middle on the right side, 
(Tr. 18). Witnesses, including the Deputy Sheriff, testified 
that the Defendants Oldsmobile had left skid marks in the 
road for a d~stance of about thirty (30) feet before point of 
impact, (Tr. 124). 
The force of the impact knocked the Plaintiff and the 
other occupants of the jeep through the air and approxim-
ately fifty (50) feet where they landed in a ditch. The 
Plaintiff was rendered unconscious by the force of ·~he 
impact, (Tr. 20). The Plaintiff's jeep was knocked approx-
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imately forty ( 40) to forty-five ( 45) feet up the Topaz 
road West, where it came to rest on its side, (Tr. 18 and 19). 
The Defendants Oldsmobile came to a stop approximately 
thirty (30) feet to the West of the point of impact, (Tr. 19 
and 83). 
The Plaintiff and Norma Poulsen testified that the De-
fendant, Udell Wood, soon after the impact, came over to 
where they were lying in the ditch and attempted to put 
a seat cover under Mrs. Poulsen's head in an effort to hold 
it out of the water and Defendant Wood said, "Lady you are 
hunt bad, My God, If I had only been watching the road 
instead of looking for houses and not driving so fast ·~his 
never would have happened." (Tr. 26). Again two disinter-
ested boys testified hearing Defendant Vvood state that, "It 
was all my fault that if I had been watching the road and 
not driving so fast the accident wouldn't have happened." 
(Tr. 97, 102, 103). He said to one of these witnesses he 
was driving .seventy (70) miles per hour. (Tr. 103). The 
Plaintiff testified defendant \Vood was going 70 miles per 
hour, (Tr. 18). The Defendant Wood was according to his 
own testimony traveling fifty (50) miles per hour as he ap· 
preached the blind intersection, (Tr. 159), and he did not 
look either to the right or the left as he approached the in-
tersection, (Tr. 186). Defendant further testified that as 
soon as he observed the Poulsen car it was in the intersec· 
tion and he applied his brakes, but was unable to stop. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUST!· 
FY THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE 
OF THE NEGLIENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
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2. THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
WOOD WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AC-
CIDENT 
J. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS NOT GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COir!MIT ERROR 
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' FIRST MO-
TION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT. ERROR 
IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MO-
TION FOR A NON-SUIT. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT C01'vllk1IT ERROR 
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' SECOND 
lr!OTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
7. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMlviiT ERROR 
IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
A ]UDG1vlENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMI1 _ 'ERROR 
IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANTS' !dOTION 
FOR A NE~V TRIAL. 
ARGUEl\'IENT 
1. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ]USTI-
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FY THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE IS-
SUE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The facts in the Poulsen case including the condition 
of the roads, the width of the roads, the visibility on the 
roads, the visual obstruction at the intersection, the speed 
of the automobiles, the ability to observe each other, the 
failure to .stop or yield the right of way by the Defendant, 
the failure of the Defendant to keep a proper look-out, are 
all very carefully considered and included in the opinion 
in an almost identical case of Amasa Lowder and Alene S. 
Lowder, Plaintiffs vs. Ruth Holley and John Holley, De-
fendants, which case was just recently decided by the Sup-
reme Court of the State of Utah, and which is not yet in 
the Utah reports or the Pacific Reporter but which case 
is referred to in the advance sheets as Civil Case No. 7486, 
Utah State Supreme Court. A unanimous decision was ren-
dered in that case sustaining the trial court decision in fav-
or of the Plaintiff. 
In that case also the appellants attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the court's findings that Ruth Hol-
ley was negligant or that her negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
Referring now to theLowder vs. Holley case, Ruth Holley 
testified she was. driving at the rate of thirty (30) miles per 
hour. She admitted she did not look East of the intersection 
until she was almost at the intersection, then her view was 
obstructed by a pile of dirt and she couldn't see anything. 
Officers who investigated that accident gave as their opin-
ion that the Holley car was traveling at the rate of forty 
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(40) to fifty (50) miles per hour. 
Now let us look at the Poulsen case which shows an even 
greater amount of negligence on the part of the Defendant. 
If we read the record in the light most favorable to the 
respondents, as we must do since the triers of the facts 
found in their favor, we could well conclude that defend-
ant Wood as he approached the intersection was driving 
(70) miles per hour as testified by the Plaintiff and other 
wisnesse.s (Tr. 103). The Defendant Wood himself testified 
he was driving fifty (50) miles per hour as he approached 
the intersection and when he first saw the Plaintiff's car it 
was near the center of the intersection and he was then 
forty ( 40) or fifty feet away. This is grossly more negligant 
as to speed than was evident in the case of Amasa Lowder 
vs. Rzzth Holley. 
The evidence with regard to Defendant Vvood's failur~ to 
keep a proper look-out or even observe what was directly 
in front of him is even more conclusive as to the showing 
of negligence of the Defendant. 
Reading from the testimony of the Defendant Wood, (Tr. 
186): 
....... --
Q : Did you look at all to the left as you came along 
Topaz road? 
A: I did not. 
Q : You did not. You looked at your speedometer? 
A: yes. 
Q: Did you look to the right of the road? 
A: No. 
·9 
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Q: You didn't look to the right of the road either? 
A: No. 
Q: How fast were you driving when you saw the 
jeep? 
A : Fifty miles per hour. 
Defendants counsel on re-direct in an attempt to get ar-
ound this damaging testimony re-examined the defendant, 
(Tr. 187). 
Q : You stated on cross examination that you didn't 
look to the South or left and you did not look 
to the right as you proceeded along the Topaz 
highway, answer this, please. 
Q: At what time did you have in mind when you 
gave those answers? 
Q : Do you remember the question? 
A:Yes. 
Q :You were asked if you looked to the left and your 
answer, I believe was no. 
A: Yes. 
Q : Did you look to the right, and your answer was 
no. 
A: Yes. 
Q: What period of time did you have in mind when 
you answered those questions? 
A: Before seeing the jeep. 
This testimony is conclusive as to defendant's negligence. 
The Defendant's statement thrice given that he was driving 
10 
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too fast and not watching the road is further conclusive to 
his negligence. 
POINT 2. DEFENDANT WOOD'S NEGLIGENCE WAS 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The defendant mistakenly stated in his brief that the on-
ly alleged negligence on the part of the Defendant Wood 
was a purported seventy (70) miles per hour speed. That 
is not the case as is shown by the complaint in the record, 
the answers to the interrogatories and particularly by the 
evidence. 
The Defendant was negligant in one or more of the fol-
lowing particulars: 
1. Traveling at a speed unreasonable and dangerous un-
der the circumstances. 
2. Failure to keep a proper look-out. 
3. Failure to- yield the right of way to a vehicle which 
had entered the intersection and was half-way through it 
when the defendant first observed it on approaching the 
intersection. 
4. Failure to have his car under immediate and proper 
control. 
5. Failure to avoid the accident after observing the posi-
tion of the Plaintiff upon the road, more than half-way 
11 
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through the intersection. 
6. Failure to see the Plaintiff's jeep until it was in the 
middle of the intersection. 
The triers of the fact in the case at Bar could well have 
found from the testimony that the Defendant V/ ood was 
traveling seventy (70) miles per hour, but fifty (50) miles 
per hour, as he himself testified he was driving, would have 
been unreasonable under the circumstances, it having been 
shown that the road was lined with sunflowers and weeds 
and that there were six intersecting roads crossing i.he 
Topaz road within a distance of three miles of the accident, 
(Tr. 66, 134). And it further having been shown that the 
Defendant had traveled this road before, (Tr. 184). 
The triers of the fact could well have found from the 
positive testimony of Defendant himself that. he was not 
keeping proper look-out as he appreached the intersection 
and that he was further negligent in not yielding the right 
of way when he saw the Poulsen car in the intersection, 
more than half-way through it while the Defendant was 
still approaching the intersection some forty ( 40) or fifty 
(50) feet away. 
It is uncontridicted that there were no stop signs on eith-
er of these intersecting roads, (Tr. 134), and that the De-
fendant was under just as much duty to observe reasonable 
care as was the Plaintiff. Had the Defendant been using 
one small part of the precaution and care which the Plain-
tiff used in crossing the intersection the accident would 
not have happened. It was shown beyond any question that 
the Defendant was traveling at a rate of speed more than 
12 
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,_ 
~even (7) times the speed of the Plaintiff and that excessive 
speed together with his failure to look and his failure to 
yield the right of way was the proximate cause of the ac-
cident. 
"The general requirements with reference to speed 
and control in the operation of automobiles apply 
to drivers approaching or entering street or highway 
crossings or intersections, so that, irrespective of 
statute, it is the duty of such a driver in the exercise 
of ordinary care, on approaching or traversing a 
street crossing, to operate his car at a rate of speed 
which is lawful and reasonable under the circum-
stances, and to have it under such control that he 
may stop it so as to avoid obstructions or objects 
crossing his path; the question of what, within this 
rule, is an improper rate of speed and whether the 
motorist retained the requisite control of the car 
being one of fact." Sec. 1030, Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law and Practice, Blashfield, Vol. 2. 
The matter of care required of motorists under circum-
stances of this kind is discussed in American Jurisprudence, 
Volume 5, Page 597, wherein it states: 
Although automobiles are comparatively recent in 
use, there is nothing novel in the principles of law 
to be applied with respect to travel in them on the 
highways. It is a well established principle of law, 
even in the absence of statutory requirements, that 
the operator of a motor vehicle must exercise ordin-
ary, reasonable, or due care - - that is, that degree 
of care and caution which an ordinarily careful and 
prudent person would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances. Negligence is failure to exer-
cise reasonable care - - that is, the care which the 
ordinary, reasonable man would use under the cir-
cumstances. Obviously, ti1e care required of a motor-
ist is controlled bv, and depends upon, the place, 
circumstances. conditions, and surroundings. There 
is no arbitrary or fixed rule. A statute or ordinance 
13 
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which, without regard to care or negligence or the 
violat10n o£ spec1uc regulat10ns, unaertakes to for-
bid the runmng of an automoblle so as to inflict 
aamage or InJUry, or, more spec1hcauy, so as to coJ.-
lide w1th other Vt!hlcles or with persons, in uncon-
stitutional in that it is unreasonable and oppressive. 
There are two divergent theories upon the question 
of defining the measure of care which 1s requ1reci 
to obviate the charge of negligence. According to 
one theory, care is divided Into three degrees: (1) 
Slight care, (2) ordinary care, and (3) extraordinary 
care. According to the other theory, the care which 
must be exercised to avoid the charge of negligence 
is always ordinary care - - that is, the care which 
ordinarily prudent persons exercise in the same or 
similar circumstances. The care which ordinarly pru-
dent persons exercise in the same or similar circum-
tances. The care which ordinarily prudent persons 
thus exercise obviously depends upon the circum-
stances. For example, an ordinarily prudent person 
driving through a street in which children are play-
ing would drive slower and have his car under bet-
ter control than he would when driving through a 
street which was to all appearances clear or in which 
only adults were seen .. The one theory would char-
acterize the care exercised in driving through a 
street in which children were playing as extraordin· 
ary care. The other would characterize such care as 
ordinary care under the circumstances.. The latter 
theory has been adopted in the discussion herein .. 
Duty to Keep Car Under Contro.J. It is a general 
rule of law that part of the duty of an operator of 
a motor vehicle is to keep his machine always under 
control so as to avoid collision with vehicles, pede-
strians, and other persons properly using the high-
way. 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 227. 
It is a well established rule that the o;Jera~or of 
a motor vheicle must keep a reasonably careful look-
out so that he may be able to avoid collisions with 
persons or vehicles upon the highway. 134 P 941 
is A.- L. R. 667. 
Duty to Anticipate Presence of Others. It is a gener-
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al rule of law that an operator of a motor vehicle 
has no right to assume that the road is clear, but 
that under virtually all circumstances and at all 
times, he must be reasonably vigilant and must anti-
cipate and expect the presence of others. Zarzana v. 
Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 179 P. 203, 15 A. L. R. 401. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LA~V. 
In the recent case of Amasa Lowder vs. Ruth Holley, 
above referred to , the appellants argue that Amasa Low-
der's contributing negligence precluded him from any re-
coverage from damage and injury. They argue Lowder fail-
ed to look and see Ruth Holley's truck before he entered 
the intersection and had he looked he would have seen 
the truck and it would have been his duty to refrain from 
entering the intersection until he could do so safely. In this 
case the able opinion written by Justice Wade, and Chief 
Justice Wolf's learned concurring opinion has definitely 
clarified the law in intersection accidents. 
Justice Wade in his opinion says, "Appellants 
strenuously argue that respondent Amasa Lowder's 
contributory negligence precludes both him and his 
wife from any recovery for damages and iniuries. 
They argue that he failed to look and see Ruth Hol-
ley's truck before he entered the intersection and 
had he looked he would have s~en the truck and it 
would have been his duty to refrain from entering 
the intersection until he could do so safely. Appel-
lants are correct in stating that before entering an 
intersection the driver of a car must look and deter-
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mine whether it is safe to enter. However, under the 
facts as the court found them, had Amasa Lowder 
observed the truck just before he entered the inter-
section he would have been justified in considering 
it safe to enter because at that point, if the truck was 
being driven at the rate of 50 miles per hour, and 
Amatla Lowder was driving at from 5 to 10 miles per 
hour, as the trier of the facts could reasonably have 
found, then the truck would have been at least 250 
feet from th intersection since his car he~d tr-aveled 
almost the entire distance across the inter~~~tion be-
fore the impact. and this being so he could h;tve as-
sumed and acten on the assumn+;o., that +h"! nriver of 
the truck would exercise .ordinarv a,rl reaso,ab1e 
care in its driving- and that it would be safe to 
croc;s the intersection. H::~rl Rnth Ho11:>v expr~ic;ed 
such reasonable and orrlin~rv care the comc;io, 
would not have occurred. Under such a state of fact~ 
Amasa Lowder's failure to see the truck ro11ld in no 
way have contributed to the acciil.ent. The ('n,,rt, 
therefore. did :rot err in finding that Amasa Low-
der was not contributorily negligent." 
Chief Justice Wolfe says in his concurring opin-
ion, "As the Plaintiff approached the intersection, 
he looked in both directions, shifted into second gear 
and proceeded across at 5 to 10 miles per hour. Plain-
tiff had gone about two-thirds of the way across the 
intersection so that the front of his car had reached 
the fence line on the west side of the north-south 
road, upon which defendant was approaching from 
the north, when Plaintiff's car was struck in the 
right rear by defendant's truck. The investigating 
officer estimated that the defendant was traveling 
between 40 and 50 miles per hour, basing his opinion 
upon defendant's skid marks and the damage to both 
automobiles. Thus, the deefndant was traveling ap-
proximately seven times faster than the plaintiff. 
Evidence concerning the presence of a dirt pile and 
an orchard which affected visibility was considered 
by the trial judge, sitting as the fact finder. Judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff." 
"I believe the judgment should be affirmed be-
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cause the great disparity in speed between these 
two automobiles places this case in the Hess V. 
Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2D 510 category rath-
er than that of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 
350. Although the road defendant was traveling is a 
better road permitting greater speed, there was no 
stop sign at this intersection. Both roads are gravel. 
Whether the plaintiff upon entering the intersec-
tion should have observed the defendant's car, which 
could have been some 250 feet away, or if upon dis-
covering it plaintiff reasonably could have assumed 
that he had the right of way and that the defend-
ant would slow up and let him across are all ques-
tions of fact. Reasonable minds can and certainly do 
differ in such a situation as this. I cannot say there 
was error in the fact finder's conclusions." 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Archie Poulsen testified that 
he stopped his jeep with the front wheels approximately 
three (3) feet from the oiled portion of the Topaz road, (Tr. 
15). This \vould have left the front of his vehicle extend-
ing onto about two and one-half (2 1-2) feet of graveled 
road which was a traveled portion of the highway. Loaded 
ore trucks were frequently coming from the west, (Tr. 15, 
53, 5'), and visibility to the west was more obstructed than 
was the visibility to the east because or the sunflowers ex-
tending out nearer to the road on the west side of the inter-
section because of the turn in the ditch at the intersection, 
(Tr .. 53, 57). The Plaintiff had driven as far into the inter-
section as it was reasonably safe to drive before stopping the 
jeep. From this point he testified that he could see east al-
ong the Topaz road a distance of about four hundred ( 400) 
feet, (Tr. 15, 18, 53), and that he did not observe any traffic 
upon the highway in that 400 foot area. The Plaintiff test-
ified he then loo!~ed \Vest, put the jeep in gear and drove 
the jeep ahead so he could see up the road to the left or to 
the \Vest and observe there was no traffic coming, he turned 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and looked East again and saw the defendants car coming 
toward him at a terrific rate of speed estimated by him at 
seventy (70) miles per hour equivalent to 102 feet per sec-
ond. Mrs. Poulsen testified that she looked east when ·~hey 
stopped at the Topaz road and that she observed no 'traffic, 
(Tr. 111). 
The only recognizable difference in the facts in the Low-
der vs. Holley case from the Poulsen case is that Lowder 
drove through the intersection without stopping to observe 
the traffic to the right and left and Poulsen being more 
cautious drove until the front wheels of his jeep were with-
in a few feet of the oil and the front of his car actually 
extending out into the traveled portion of the road, then 
stopped and according to the undisputed testimony looked 
to the east then to the west before proceeding. 
Certainly such additional caution tends to strengthen the 
Poulsen case. And how could anyone be found to say that 
with the Plaintiff exercising all these precautions that his 
conduct was so negligent that there was no room for doubt 
in the minds of reasonable men. 
Appellant seeks to color the facts by making it appear a 
negligent act for the Plaintiff to ride in a green jeep with 
a brown top. Can it be that the defendant Wood was so 
negligent and reckless in his observation that he could not 
distinguish a green jeep with a brown top from a clump 
of sunflowers? 
When the Plaintiff stopped his car on the edge of the 
Topaz road there was not a blanket wall of sunflowers ex-
tending up in front of his windshield as the appellants 
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would suppose. There were no sunflowers to his right for 
fifteen feet and then their height and thickness naturally 
varied so that it is only natural that the Plaintiff coming 
to the edge of the Topaz road could see past the edge of the 
sunflowers for several hundred feet up the road and the 
Plaintiff testified he could see up the road to a certain 
telephone pole which he estimated to be and later measured 
to find it a distance of approximately four hundred ( 400) 
feet. 
The time element corresponds exactly with this testimony. 
After stopping and looking in each direction then putting 
the jeep in low gear and cautiously moving ahead so he 
could see further up the road to the West from which .dir-
ection the loaded ore trucks came until he had traveled at an 
average speed of three (3) to five (5) miles per hour, a 
distance of approximately ten (10) feet, it is reasonable that 
five to eight seconds had been consumed and defendant had 
traveled at least five hundred (500) feet or more. There-
fore, the defendants car must have been at least five hund-
red (500) feet away when plaintiff stopped before crossing 
the intersection. His reason then for not seeing the defend-
ants car was that it was not within range of vision. 
It is impossible to conceive how the plaintiff could have 
been more careful and observing than he was. His precau-
tions and care were greater than that of a reasonable man. 
They were much greater than that of Amasa Lowder. The 
plaintiff would have to have left his jeep and walked out 
in front of it to have shown more care, then by the time he 
returned to the drivers seat someone like the defendant driv-
ing at an unreasonable speed would have still come so far 
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that if Plaintiff could not have relied on the other driver 
to use reasonable care he could never cross. 
The court in the Lowder case held that Plaintiff was pro-
ceeding with due care in crossing when he could see up the 
road 250 feet from intersection. .In the case of Ward vs. 
Gildee, 186 P. 612 the court held that the statute giving the 
driver on the right, the right of way was inapplicable where 
such driver was 145 feet from intersection when the first 
driver entered, and that the latter had the clear right to 
make the first crossing. 
The Defendants argument that the Plaintiff Archie Poul-
sen, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law is bas-
ed upon a premise that is not supported by the evidence. 
That is, that the Plaintiff, Archie Poulsen, could have seen 
the defendant's automobile but failed to look.The plain facts 
are that the defendant's car was not within range of vision 
when Plaintiff looked. The defendant cites for authority, 
the following cases: Bullock vs. Luke, 98 P.2d 350, Conklin 
vs. Wal.sh, 193 P. 2d 437, Gren vs. No·rton, 215 P. 356, Hic-
kock vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514, Minqus vs. Olso·n, 201 P. 2d 
495, Delsman vs. Bertotti, a State of Washington case, 93 
P. 2d 371. 
These cases are sound for the principle they involve, but 
it is immediately clear to the reader that these cases cited by 
the defendant in their brief are not applicable to the facts 
in this case. In Bullock vs. Luke the court found that the 
driver of the vehicle was negligent in not seeing the car 
which hit him when he had an unobstructed view for a dis-
tance of from two hundred (200) to eight hundred (800) 
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feet varying inversely with his proximity to the intersec-
tion. The case presumes that the other vehicle was within 
the driver's vision and could have been seen had the driver 
looked. 
In the case Conklin vs. J.Valsh the fact situation is en-
tirely unrelated to the facts in the case at bar. There the 
truck driver going thirty (30) miles to forty-five ( 45) miles 
per hour observed the approaching car a quarter of a block 
before he reached the intersection and knew it was coming 
but failed to look again when a mere- glance would have 
revealed the Conklin car. 
The case of Gren vs. Norton 213 P. 2d 356 only remotely 
bares upon the present case. In that case the Plaintiff drove 
across an arterial highway where his view of oncoming 
traffic was unobstructed for more than a mile. He drove 
through safety zone in the center of the road, and a distance 
of more than 108 feet into the path of the oncoming truck, 
apparently obliviously to the truck which was sounding 
its horn in an effort to cause the plaintiff to stop in the 
safety zone in the center of the street which he could have 
reasonably done, and which he reasonably would have been 
expected to do. 
The case of Hie/rock vs. Skinner is not like the present 
case because there the plaintiff twenty feet back of the 
intersection actually saw the defendant's car approaching a 
distance of four hundred (400) to five hundred (500) feet 
away .. Then he drove sixty-five (65) feet into the intersec-
tion without again looking at the oncoming car. The court 
said in that case: "Neither (driver) should be permitted to 
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close his eyes to the other vehicles which he knov.rs or has 
reason to to believe are approaching simply because a state 
statute or a municipal ordinance designates him the prefer-
red driver." The Plaintiff in that case drove some sixty-
five (65} feet crossing an arterial highway without ever 
again looking in the direction where he had first observed 
a vehicle coming toward him. 
In the case of Delsman vs. Bertotti, a State of \Vashing-
ton Case, the court held that the plaintiff could not see the 
entire width of the street looking through a gap in the 
hedge and that he did not make a reasonable observation 
and his failure to make observation constituted contributory 
negligence. 
The case of Mingus vs. Olson, 201 P. 2d 495, is not in 
point as it involves two pedestrians who admittedly failed 
to look for traffic as they crossed a street usualy heavy with 
traffic and the court properly disallowed recovery. 
In the case of Demcerb vs. Pawtucke·t Cabinet :md Build-
ers Finishing Company, Incorporated, 193 A 622 RI 451, 
cited by the defendants in their brief the facts are again un-
related in that before Plaintiff started across intersection or 
School street he observed the defendants truck twenty-five 
(25) or thirty (30} feet away and hadn't entered the inter-
section when he so observed it. The court held that an ord-
inary prudent person would not have acted as did the plain-
tiff but further held that the question of contributory negli-
gence is ordinarly one for the jury unless it clearly appears 
that the only proper conclusion from the undisputed facts 
is that in the circumstances of the case a person of ordinary 
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prudence would have not acted as did the plaintiff. 
Again the case of Musten vs. West, cited by the defend-
ant, 46 So. 2d 136, bares little or no similarity to the case 
at bar, because in that case the plaintiff's car proceeded 
without stopping into a street designated "Stop" by city 
ordinance, and then without ever looking, the driver travel-
ed to or past the center of the intersection when she was 
struck broad side by the defendant West's automobile which 
had approached and entered the intersection on the favored 
street at a speed in excess of the maximum fixed by the 
city ordinance. The proceeding through the stop sign and 
the failure to make any reasonable observance in that case 
was a bar to recovery. 
The defendant also cites the case of Epps vs. Standard 
Supply and Hardware Company, 4 So. 2d 790, again there 
is little or no similarity of this case to the Poulsen vs. Man-
ness case or the Lowder vs. Holley case. Epps said he only 
looked fifty feet up the street when the evidence shows he 
could have seen a considerable distanc £arthur as there was 
nothing to obstruct his view. 
In Carey vs. DeRose, 288 No. W 165, the court merely 
held as did the Utah court in Bullock vs. Luke, that a person 
was required to see that which was plainly visible when 
he had an unobstructed view. 
The case at bar comes very definitely in the category oi 
Hess vs. Robison, 163 P. 2d 510, which was decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court in an very similar fact situation 
as the case at bar. In this case plaintiff was driving at fif-
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teen miles per hour southward on Grant Avenue, describeJ 
as a "through street", "stop street", or arterial highway. 
Defendants were driving their ambulance eastward on Thir-
ty-first Street at a speed variously estimated by the wit-
nesses at from twenty-five to fifty miles per hour as it ap-
proached the intersection .. The point of collision was about 
three (3) feet VI est of the center point of the intersection. 
The plaintiff admittedly failed to look to the right on ap-
proaching the intersection and the defendant failed to ob-
serve the stop sign and the court held both parties negli-
gent at matter of law but submitted to the jury the question 
of whether Plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of 
the accident. 
The Supreme Court of Utah said in that case: 
For the plaintiff's negligence to be a defense for 
the defendant, it must not only exist at the same 
time and place as conditions created or the forces 
put in operation by the negligence of defendants, but 
it must set in operation a force, or create a condition, 
which had a share in producing the injury. Proxi-
mate cause of an injury means that the injury was 
the natural and probable consequence which a per-
son of ordinary foresight and prudence would have 
anticipated. Arkansas Valley Trust Company vs. 
Mcilroy, 97 Ark. 160 133 S. W. 816, 31 LR. A., N. S. 
1020. To be proximate cause of an injury it must be 
an efficient act of causation and separated from its 
effect by no other act of causation. There must be 
a causal connection between the act or omission and 
subsequent injury. 
As to what the circumstances were at the time 
plaintiff entered the intersection, as to whether en-
tering under such circumstances was an act from 
which a person of ordinary prudence and caution 
would have foreseen that some injury would likely 
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result, are matters upon which reasonable minds 
may differ. As such they are properly for the jury. 
Proximate cause and contributory negligence are 
ordinarily questions of fact for the jury to deter-
mine under all the circumstances.. Great N. R. Co. 
v. Thompson, 9 Cir., 199 F. 395, 118 C. C. A. 79, 47 
L. R.-A. N. S., 506; Hales v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 6 
Cir., 200 F. 533, 118 C. C. A. 627. Questions of negli-
gence do not become questions of law for the court 
except where the facts are such that all reasonable 
men draw the same conclusions. Baltimo·re & Ohio 
R. Co. v. Taylor, 4 Cir., 186 F. 828. 109 C. C. A. 172; 
O,Donnel v. Riter-Conley Mfg. Co·., 172 Ill. App. 
601; Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N. D. 173, 73 N. W. 427. 
Since in this case there is a question as to what 
were the circumstances existing when plaintiff en~ 
tered the intersection. and where those circumstan-
ces may be found bv the trie,. of the fact to he ~uch 
that reasonable men miP."ht differ as to whether plain-
tiff's conduct in enterin~ the intersection was such 
as an ordinarily prudent and careful man might do 
under the circumstances. there was a question for 
the iurv as to whether plaintiff's negligence was con-
+-ributory, that is, was a proximate cause . of the in-
jury. 
It follows that the judgment should be and is 
affirmed. Costs to respendent. 
In the case at Bar Poulsen's conduct showed much more 
care than did Robison in the case above quoted. 
In the case of Nielson vs. Manchley 202 Pacific 
2nd 547 decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in 
February, 1949-. that court reversed the lower Court 
which had held that the Plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. In that case a school 
bus was being backed out of defendants yard into 
the street. Plaintiff using the street saw the bus 
backing out three hundred (300) feet away but con-
tinued his speed at twenty-five (25) miles per hour 
till he reached within 116 of the bus and applied his 
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brakes but the icy road prevented his stopping and 
he hit the bus. The Supreme Court held the Lower 
Court erred in holding Plaintiff was negligent as 
a matter of law and said the question of the Plain-
tiff's contributory negligence should have been left 
to the jury. 
The matter of contributory negligence as constituting 
proximate cause of an accident is discussed in American 
Jurisprudence, Volume 5, Page 744, in the following lan-
guage: 
It is essential that the acts complained of as con-
stituting contributory negligence contribute direct-
ly and proximately to the accident. Contributory 
negligence in violating a statute by driving on the 
wrong side of the road, must,in order to defeat re-
covery, have been the proximate cause of the injury. 
The mere occurrence of an act of negligence on the 
part of the person instituting the action will not, of 
itself, preclude recovery, unless the surrounding cir-
cumstances establish such act as the direct cause of 
the accident reulting in the injuries complained of. 
Thus, the defense of contributory negligence will 
fail where the relationship of the fault with respect 
to the accident as a proximate and contributory cause 
is not a necessary inference under the circumstances. 
Quoting further from Volume 5 of American Jurisprud-
ence Page 745, the rule is stated as follows: 
When the facts relating to contributory negli-
e:ence are of such a character that reasonable minds 
~ight reach different conclusions thereon, a ques-
tion of fact is presented for the determination of 
the jury. Keir vs. Trager, 7 P. (2D) 49, 81 A. L. R. 
181. 
The triers of the fact were justified in finding from the 
evidence that there was no contributory negligence whatso-
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l._ 
ever on the part of the Plaintiff Poulsen and that they could 
well have found all of his actions measured up to the care 
required of a reasonably prudent man under the circum-
stances. It appears clear and definite that the care, the cau-
tion, and the observances of the safety shown by the Plain-
tiff was greater than that shown by the Plain-
tiffs in the case of Robinson vs. Hess, 163 P. 2d 510, Nielson 
vs. JI,Janchley, 202 Pac. 2547 and Lowder vs. Holley, Utah 
Advance Sheet 7486, all of which cases have recently been 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court and it is contended 
that Poulsen vs. Manness, et. al., comes clearly within this 
class of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in the re-
cord supports the verdict of the jury as rendered in the trial 
court. This court has held on numerous occasions that the 
record must be read in the light most favorable to the res-
pondents when the triers of the fact have found in their 
favor. 
American Jurisprudence Volume 39, Page 1045, gives the 
positive statement of the law concerning the right of the 
jury to pass upon questions of liability in the following 
words: 
The right of a party in a negligence action to 
have the jury pass upon the question of liability 
becomes absolute where the facts are in dispute and 
the evidence is conflicting, or when the proof dis-
closes such a state of facts, whether controverted or 
not, that, in essaying to fix responsibility for the in-
jury or damage, different minds may arrive reason-
ably at different conclusions or may disagree reas-
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onably as to the inferences to be drawn from the 
facts. Thus, where there is a direct conflict of test-
imony upon a matter of fact, the question must be 
left to the jury to determine, without regard to the 
number of witnesses upon either side or the char-
acter of the testimony. 
In the further case of Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation 
Company (Utah 1944) 147 P (2) 875, a case involving an 
automobile collision, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
This is a case at law. It therefore follows that this 
appeal is upon questions of law alone. That being 
true ·the function of this court is not to pass upon 
the weight of the evidence, nor to determine con-
flicts therein but to examine it solely for the pur-
poses of determining whether or not the judgment 
finds substantial support in the evidence. In so ex-
amining the evidence all reasonable presumptions 
are in favor of the trial court's findings and judg-
ment, and the evidence must be considered in the 
light most favorable to them. If the findings and 
judgment are substantially supported by the evid-
ence, then the court may not disturb them. 
It is earnestly contended that no reasaon has been shown 
from the evidence in this case which would justify the 
court in taking the case from the jury and that the evid-
ence clearly supports the verdict rendered and the rulings 
of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELDON ELIASON, and 
PRESTON D. RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
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